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One of the most significant hurdles for any retributive theory of punishment is to explain how punishment, which includes the deliberate infliction of harm, can be seen as an intrinsic good. (A question raised by this comment.) Consider the following example. On the schoolyard, Albert gets picked on and pushed around by Bob for no reason. As Albert breaks down crying, Carl steps in and gives Bob a competent beating. What can be said about the beating, assuming that it did not physically injure Bob? It prevented Bob from further abusing Albert, and it might deter others from doing so in the future. It might even keep others from abusing other kids generally, depending on their conscience and/or Carl’s reputation. But while that description is certainly correct, it remains somewhat incomplete. We also feel that “justice prevailed,” that “Bob got what he deserved,” and that a wrong has been righted. The latter might be even more intuitive in cases, where the victim stands up to the bully. (In the movies, that’s where the annoying triumph-of-the-human-spirit theme kicks in.) We wouldn’t naturally describe such acts of asserting oneself, of overcoming adversity, of standing up for what’s decent and right in consequentialist terms. We might even say that the beating that Bob received at the hands of Carl or Albert was a good thing. That notion, I believe, is at the heart of the retributive intuition that punishment, including hard treatment, is only incompletely described as a necessary evil. In certain situations, it may well be an intrinsic good.

Of course, I cheated a little bit. If Albert stands up to his tormentor Bob, he is defending himself, he is not meting out punishment. But what if Carl administers the beating just after Bob is done with Albert and about to walk away from his humiliated victim? Our intuitions would not change significantly. The beating would still be understood as an “act of justice.” (By the way, why be so exceedingly squeamish here? Every revenge movie ‚Äì Kill Bill, the Godfather, Unforgiven, A Better Tomorrow, etc. ‚Äìconvinces us at least temporarily of the desirability of veritable killing sprees. If it didn’t feel good to see the villains die, there would be no revenge movies around.)

Note that I am not trying to make a normative claim (yet). I am not saying that punishment should be justified in retributive terms, because retributivism captures some of our intuitions, an argument that would imply a norm, validating empirical evidence as support for a normative claim. My claim is so far purely empirical. Retributive theories do in fact correctly capture and express certain common emotional reactions to crime and punishment, which explains – not justifies – their persistence.

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