Comments on: Did I ever mention how I don’t like social contract theory? http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/327 Notes from the intersection of law, society, technology, economics, and culture Tue, 06 Jan 2009 14:24:39 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2 By: Ben Samuel Nelson http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/327#comment-8645 Ben Samuel Nelson Fri, 15 Dec 2006 04:27:43 +0000 http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/327#comment-8645 But there's dependency in that scenario all the same. It's just that we've shifted our description from the dependency upon prudential restraint plus accurate information, to a mere dependency upon accurate information. After all, when I'm being swindled by that shifty mayor, I'm still dependent upon him for the truth, due to a variety of technical reasons. Here we're confronted with a distinction between dependency which is merely psychological, and that which is "more real", involving objects that are the subject of well-grounded beliefs. I wouldn't hesitate to make room for the former, and so, I'd also allow for and invite investigations into meaning and mere appearances. I should clarify that I'm not saying that a social actor has to be aware of their dependencies in order for them to be a candidate explanation for the basis of law. I think we have to go beyond the actor, to some extent, if we are to describe the full origins of law. So it's no surprise that we don't find any given actor weighing a balance of dependencies in all matters at all times. Moreover, I'm worried about the limited scope of your investigation. I mean, the symbolic universe is important in social science, but it's not exhaustive. And the only reason why we might restrict ourselves to an analysis of metaphor, meaning, and language when trying to answer the question of "What is the origin and basis for law?", is if we thought that those were our only tools for social investigation. But they're not. There are grain shipments, and backroom deals, and spies in alleyways, and ignorant voters, and ambitious slaveowners trying to escape annoying British rule. These, and all the other "real" things, motives, events, behaviors, and interactions contribute significantly to an adequate social description, and are not obviously metaphorical in any sense we're talking about. So it seems to me that if the test of "descriptive adequacy" is taken to mean "an exhaustive explanation", then the metaphorical contract has failed the test. Maybe if we restricted our inquiry to smaller grounds, it would succeed: i.e., if we were to ask, "What is the cognitive basis for the default support for law (during relatively stable economic times)?", then the explanation according to metaphor would seem to work to a greater extent. And surely, what you've said lays out some limits for the kinds of interactions that people will have with their government and vice versa. But I wouldn't call it either descriptively adequate, or contractual. (I'm never exactly sure how far "constructionism" is meant to go. Since we're talking about ways of *describing* reality, then that automatically suggests something artificial, even if we're just debating over what aspects of the situation to emphasize. But surely mere debates over emphasis do not capture what is meant by those who call themselves "constructionists".) But there’s dependency in that scenario all the same. It’s just that we’ve shifted our description from the dependency upon prudential restraint plus accurate information, to a mere dependency upon accurate information. After all, when I’m being swindled by that shifty mayor, I’m still dependent upon him for the truth, due to a variety of technical reasons. Here we’re confronted with a distinction between dependency which is merely psychological, and that which is “more real”, involving objects that are the subject of well-grounded beliefs. I wouldn’t hesitate to make room for the former, and so, I’d also allow for and invite investigations into meaning and mere appearances.

I should clarify that I’m not saying that a social actor has to be aware of their dependencies in order for them to be a candidate explanation for the basis of law. I think we have to go beyond the actor, to some extent, if we are to describe the full origins of law. So it’s no surprise that we don’t find any given actor weighing a balance of dependencies in all matters at all times.

Moreover, I’m worried about the limited scope of your investigation. I mean, the symbolic universe is important in social science, but it’s not exhaustive. And the only reason why we might restrict ourselves to an analysis of metaphor, meaning, and language when trying to answer the question of “What is the origin and basis for law?”, is if we thought that those were our only tools for social investigation. But they’re not. There are grain shipments, and backroom deals, and spies in alleyways, and ignorant voters, and ambitious slaveowners trying to escape annoying British rule. These, and all the other “real” things, motives, events, behaviors, and interactions contribute significantly to an adequate social description, and are not obviously metaphorical in any sense we’re talking about. So it seems to me that if the test of “descriptive adequacy” is taken to mean “an exhaustive explanation”, then the metaphorical contract has failed the test.

Maybe if we restricted our inquiry to smaller grounds, it would succeed: i.e., if we were to ask, “What is the cognitive basis for the default support for law (during relatively stable economic times)?”, then the explanation according to metaphor would seem to work to a greater extent. And surely, what you’ve said lays out some limits for the kinds of interactions that people will have with their government and vice versa. But I wouldn’t call it either descriptively adequate, or contractual.

(I’m never exactly sure how far “constructionism” is meant to go. Since we’re talking about ways of *describing* reality, then that automatically suggests something artificial, even if we’re just debating over what aspects of the situation to emphasize. But surely mere debates over emphasis do not capture what is meant by those who call themselves “constructionists”.)

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