You’re far too generous in your remarks. The (logical) difference between understanding and interpretation goes back to Wittgenstein, and Patterson is an eloquent defender of his views in this regard, at least with respect to law (but Dennis would follow W. in generalizing the argument beyond any specific field of inquiry/praxis). I suppose there are some construals of interpretation that would make it identical to understanding, a kind of second-order understanding on the order of Frankfurt’s second-order desires if one wants to incorporate a distinction without buying into the Wittgentsteinian point (I think Gadamer is an instance of this, and I myself was deeply affected by his hermeneutics, whatever the points scored by Habermas in the subsequent debate; later, correspondence with Dennis Patterson together with the reading of his work, convinced me he–or they–may be onto something here…) but in the Wittgensteinan account that simply cannot be the case. Read Patterson’s paper in full, ‘Interpretation in Law,’ available at SSRN and some of the referenced works in the notes. But you’re right insofar as this distinction need not, in the end, be central to making a case against ‘originalism.’ I wish I had more time to devote to this topic and think things through in a more systematic and helpful way (without relying so much on others) but outstanding commitments mean I have to wait until another day. Still, I’m most appreciative of your kind comments.