Comments on: Power and Legitimacy http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/271 Notes from the intersection of law, society, technology, economics, and culture Thu, 20 Nov 2008 10:24:21 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2 By: Ben Samuel Nelson http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/271#comment-3011 Ben Samuel Nelson Wed, 23 Aug 2006 17:00:23 +0000 http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/271#comment-3011 Matt, the use of words like "contract" and "consent" are misleading in the sense that they underplay the admixture of coercion, evidenced by the lone voice who shouts, “The United States really exists, and it’ll come down hard on you!”. I am convinced that emergence must be discussed in other terms or else present a misleading view of things. My view on the big picture may or may not be slightly at odds with yours. Perhaps I've misunderstood your emphases. But the way I understand the matter, there are different kinds of power, which can be organized according to their sources of influence. Some kinds resemble your model, others don't. Power can be distinguished from mere persuasion in that the former has to do with the suppression of resistence, while the latter has to do with cooperation in spite of resistence. Power has two kinds: inert and social. Inert power is power over objects. A man who can lift 200 pounds has more inert power than one who can only lift a feather. Social power is power over people. Social power can be divided into at least two kinds: naked and organizational power. Naked power involves simple coercion. Organizational power involves acquiescence. Acquiescence is composed of trust and/or apathy to the rule of the powerful. These are cases where any resistence is quelled either by immediate group members or by the individuals themselves. (Dependency may be a third kind of power.) In your case study, there has been an implicit transformation of the state's power from organizational power to mere persuasion. This transformation is a) the diminuation of organizational power, and accretion of persuasive power (simultaniously when the neighbors place the conversations at the level of reason and dismiss considerations at the level of practicality); and b) the diminuation of persuasive power (when the neighbors are persuaded to pledge allegiance to the crown). What's important and relevant here is that the dismissal of practical considerations (i.e., "What if they arrest me?") is what makes the distinction between power and legitimacy seem fuzzy. So long as we presume that people are rational -- but *not* short-sightedly self-interested -- beings, power flows right from persuasion and legitimacy. But people really are, in fact, self-interested, and usually are short-sightedly self-interested. That's why the distinction between power and legitimacy is stronger than we might first expect. [These are thoughts which I've come up with over the summer after a reading of Bertrand Russell's "Power: A New Social Analysis".] Matt, the use of words like “contract” and “consent” are misleading in the sense that they underplay the admixture of coercion, evidenced by the lone voice who shouts, “The United States really exists, and it’ll come down hard on you!”. I am convinced that emergence must be discussed in other terms or else present a misleading view of things.

My view on the big picture may or may not be slightly at odds with yours. Perhaps I’ve misunderstood your emphases. But the way I understand the matter, there are different kinds of power, which can be organized according to their sources of influence. Some kinds resemble your model, others don’t.

Power can be distinguished from mere persuasion in that the former has to do with the suppression of resistence, while the latter has to do with cooperation in spite of resistence.

Power has two kinds: inert and social. Inert power is power over objects. A man who can lift 200 pounds has more inert power than one who can only lift a feather. Social power is power over people.

Social power can be divided into at least two kinds: naked and organizational power. Naked power involves simple coercion. Organizational power involves acquiescence. Acquiescence is composed of trust and/or apathy to the rule of the powerful. These are cases where any resistence is quelled either by immediate group members or by the individuals themselves. (Dependency may be a third kind of power.)

In your case study, there has been an implicit transformation of the state’s power from organizational power to mere persuasion. This transformation is
a) the diminuation of organizational power, and accretion of persuasive power (simultaniously when the neighbors place the conversations at the level of reason and dismiss considerations at the level of practicality); and
b) the diminuation of persuasive power (when the neighbors are persuaded to pledge allegiance to the crown).

What’s important and relevant here is that the dismissal of practical considerations (i.e., “What if they arrest me?”) is what makes the distinction between power and legitimacy seem fuzzy. So long as we presume that people are rational — but *not* short-sightedly self-interested — beings, power flows right from persuasion and legitimacy. But people really are, in fact, self-interested, and usually are short-sightedly self-interested. That’s why the distinction between power and legitimacy is stronger than we might first expect.

[These are thoughts which I’ve come up with over the summer after a reading of Bertrand Russell’s “Power: A New Social Analysis”.]

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