Conflict, Cooperation, and the Value of Democracy
Published by Hanno Kaiser August 6th, 2006 in PhilosophyEvery human society experiences both conflict and cooperation. Conflict, more often than not, is conflict over scarce resources, in other words, an economic problem. (There are other types of conflicts as well, but economic conflict is as close to universal for humans as it gets.)
- One prominent way of dealing with economic conflict is violence: If I want X and you want it too but we can’t both have it at the same time, then we will have to fight.
- Another way of dealing with scarcity is organized production. If I want X and you want it too, then let’s work together (= let’s each specialize and trade) and make more of X or improve X. There have been surprisingly few patterns of organizing production in history. They broadly fall into the categories of tradition (e.g., casts, guilds, apprenticeships, etc.), authoritarian rule (e.g., soviet-style central planning), and market exchange (e.g., barter, bazaars, eBay, NYSE). Virtually every real-world system of organized production that exists today contains elements of each.
- A third way is some arrangement by which you and I transform our preferences so that we no longer want X (or want less of it). Virtually every such arrangement aims at replacing (or tempering) our self-interested nature with some form of altruism.
Only option (3) requires agents to change their preference structure and thereby presumes that such a thing is possible. In contrast, options (1) and (2) operate mostly at an agent-external level, which is why realists instinctively feel drawn to (1) and (2) as explanations for human behavior and (3) has held great appeal for idealistic reformers of both secular and religious ilk.
Let’s assume for the sake of argument that humans, by and large, are in fact fundamentally self-interested, and that they are unlikely to change in that regard. That rules out (3) as a viable approach to solving the economic problem. As between (1) and (2), the latter has proven to be significantly more successful at minimizing scarcity and thus the potential for violent conflict over scarce resources. As within (2), the “free exchange” mode of organizing production is not only more efficient but also most compatible with notions of fundamental equality (e.g., no casts) and democracy. That, I believe, is the kernel of truth in the adage that “democracy follows free markets.” However, democracy follows free markets not because they both share some fundamental commitment to freedom, but rather because free markets are efficient at avoiding violence as a means of solving resource conflicts and, unlike authoritarian and traditional patterns of organizing production, are compatible with our phenomenological experience of and belief in self-determination and the resulting urge to have a say in matters concerning ourselves. In addition, the majoritarian character of democratic rule is a structural counterweight to the tendencies of free markets to produce economic elites with disproportional influence over both, the economic and the political system. The bottom line is that of all political economies within (2), the “free market plus democracy” combination seems to have emerged as the most successful means of avoiding violent conflicts over resources by means of growth and innovation - humans being what they are. That is not to say, of course, that humanity won’t self-destruct in one way or the other. There’s a good chance that it will, for example, by continuing to pursue growth qua growth over growth qua innovation, by remaining in the grip of traditional and religious superstition, and by a single-minded focus on the short run. But it means that if there’s a solution to these problems, it is to be found within (2), not within (1) or (3).
What I find attractive about this bare-bones model of both the economic the and political system is that it provides at least the outline of an explanation for what I observe in the real world without requiring me to make assumptions about human nature beyond some fairly basic propositions such as virtually universal self-interest. In addition, it seems that the above is at least continuous with the results of hard science and history, and should thus pass the test of m-naturalism. Why should we introduce intrinsic qualities of both freedom and democracy, if we can explain the world around us without them?
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I want to reply to your point about social explanations. I need to argue that we need more than organized production to explain the social world. The problem with any bare-bones model is that it doesn’t help us when we’re looking to flesh things out. Planned cooperation is attractive as a model, but as an explanation, it has limits.
For one thing, we have to ask, “What is the nature of planning?”. And the answer is not optimistic. I think that the most widely known candidate for an explanation of rational cooperation have been “social contract” theories, ala Locke or Hobbes; and so-stated, they seem hopelessly implausible, giving accounts of power-relationships which are either circuitous (as with Locke) or fanciful (as with Hobbes). It seems to me that we must be both sensitive and responsible to the notion that naked power is institutionalized violence. What appears to be relative cooperation, may in fact simply be violence of another kind. Stalinesque systems are the perfect example, but we can find more ordinary ones as well. In any case, (2) doesn’t explain enough on its own, and seems in some cases to collapse into (1). There are surely limits to what can responsibly be called coercion and what can’t, but those limits are deep within the territory of organization (economic or otherwise).
For another thing, there’s the question of the exceptions to an organization model. In that case, we’d be at a loss to explain things like the Copernican Revolution if all we have at our disposal is the language of unified economic goal-achievement. Moreover, if we ask how cooperation occurs in real-time, we run into troubles of accounting for exactly how it is that anti-social, anti-economic action happens — for instance, xenophobia. Both the heights of revolutionary genius and the depths of avaricious stupidity are unexplainable from a rationale of rational organization.
So any model of social conflict will have to use all three of the strategies you listed at minimum. Though, I must be morbid (for the sake of completeness) and note that you overlooked one strategy for conflict resolution. Namely: suicide, or (less severely) withdrawl.
To address the other point — which strategy is better, all things considered — then it’s a toss-up. Some strategies are better for some situations and not others. The West is going to have to deal in terms of (3) very soon when it comes to petrolium, for instance, or else there will be catastrophic consequences.
[Also, I’m not sure what you mean by an “intrinsic” quality there in the last sentence.]
Ben, let me address some of the issues that you raise in your comment.
(1) My bare-bones model isn’t sufficient to explain the social world. Of course not. It is incomplete in many respects. One of them is that there clearly are non-economic conflicts, e.g., over matters of religion. It would be hard to explain the crusades or the 30 year war without taking account of the “all or nothing” nature of religious conflict. Most conflicts over purity are of that nature, which is why I am so deeply suspicious of everyone pursuing purity in whatever form.
(2) I don’t rely on a social contract, at least not in any normative sense. Hobbes writings are instructive on that point. In his early works (De Homine, De Cive), he presented a theory of self-organization, based on his version of proto-”cellular automata” that (i) pursued whatever a contingent nature led them to pursue; and (ii) that were united only in their common fear of violent death. He then went on to construct a prisoners’ dilemma-type scenario, in which the players moved from mutual non-cooperation (the war of every man against every man) to cooperation by creating an overwhelming power and thereby changing the conditions of the game. Peace, in Hobbes “self-organziation” works does not rely on anything other than (divergent) self interests and (common) fear of violent death. Those are the works that I find most interesting. In the Leviathan (more specifically, in parts of the Leviathan), Hobbes introduces another model of the social contract, this time with normative force. Interestingly, he does that because the ruler in the self-interest/self-organization model lacked the power to command his subjects to die: in battle or by not resisting a death sentence. My main problem with Hobbes is that he conceived of the state of nature as a zero sum game: A’s gain is B’s loss. Hobbes never fully considered the possibility that resource competition could result in (and be alleviated by) organized production in the form of specialization and exchange.
(3) Tradition and authoritarian means of organizing production - (2a) and (2b) - often involve violence and may not differ much from (1) for those who suffer the abuse. I agree. What really separates (1) and (2) in my mind is that (1) only involves zero sum games while the point of (2) is to realize gains from specialization and functional differentiation. How those gains are distributed is another question, and I am the first to agree that gross inequalities in distribution may be indistinguishable from outright violence, in particular if they are sanctioned and enforced by the state.
(4) I don’t see how explaining common patterns of social organization in economic terms somehow lessens our ability to account for genius (e.g., Copernicus) or prejudice and bigotry. I am not claiming that people are only interested in making money. Some may feel intrigued by art and science. Others may make it their life’s purpose to hate and persecute others. All I’m saying is that whatever people’s dispositions and preferences, they tend to choose more efficient means for achieving their goals over less efficient means. The core premise of economic reasoning is that we prefer courses of action that work over those that don’t work. Let’s not make the mistake of reducing economics to matters of business and money.
(5) Why didn’t I mention suicide? Because it hasn’t taken root as a large-scale strategy for organizing societies.
(6) The question with strategy (3), in my mind, is not so much whether it would be morally preferable but whether it is feasible. (And ought does imply can). Humans just aren’t very good at limiting themselves. In my (admittedly pessimistic) view, (parts of) humanity will survive the coming ecological crisis only through radical technological progress. It frankly is too late for conservation, even if we started today, which, of course, we won’t. That’s why something resembling (2c) is my favored strategy. Of all modes of social organization, market based societies with some form of democracy have produced the most rapid pace of technological innovation.
I don’t mean to be a wag. I never really thought you were a reductionist. But still, my points regarding (1) and (4) were only offered as a warding off of any tentative endorsement of a “bare-bones” economic model.
I agree with a kind of societal emergence / evolutionary story, which I presume is somewhat like the “cellular automata” metaphor. I’ve never read or studied Hobbes’ earlier works, though perhaps I should.
My comments in that sphere were based only on Leviathan. On that score, I think it’s important to read Hobbes in the way Hobbes wrote. When he asserts that there are contracts between “every man with every man”, I take him at his word. (Be they tacit or explicit contracts — for my purposes, it doesn’t matter). And the objections which he lucidly tried to defend himself against do not seem cogent. It really isn’t the case that any reasonable person who is in constant fear of death can enter into any contract with his would-be assassin, because trust is impossible. A story about a collective unanamously joining hands in order to secure their mutual freedom and stave off mutual fear is patently implausible, not only because they have nothing to secure the confederacy but mere words, but also because they have every reason to hate and defile the would-be sovereign as they would hate and defile anarchy (Locke’s “lions and polecats” remark is an effective satire here).
A story of groups coming together in solidarity for mutual gain, or of families staying together for the same reason, ala Locke, is more plausible, but still a bit tortured. I see no reason to deny the explanatory power of power-relationships, and they seem to be partially at odds with the contract perspective. (You don’t do this, of course, but I’m speaking just in generalities at this point to be clear.)
You’re surely right about Hobbes being strangely dour about the positive benefits of human organization, a thing that Locke tried to push for.
Regarding your points on (3), they are interesting, but from my perspective they are changing the terrain of the discussion a bit. Instead of talking about general explanations for conflict, we are now talking about different kinds of situations which ought to be explained: the zero-sum, and the, uh, “not zero sum” (can’t think of a better description). In which case we seem to be leaving the bare-bones stuff behind, which makes me contented.
(4) I didn’t know it was a mistake to reduce economics to business and money (well, also to transaction and goods). I would have thought that symbol economies, including status holdings, would only be of economic interest insofar as they produce material gains. Seems far more like sociology to me (though of course ultimately these distinctions become useless to dwell on).
(5) At the risk of sounding maudlin, I can’t think of a better way to describe petroleum dependence except as “a slow collective suicide”. From what I understand the book “Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed” by Jared Diamond seems to make consistent points on this, for example, with respect to the Easter Islanders.
And anyway, what about withdrawl (which is on the same axis as suicide)? Take Switzerland. They’re neutral; they withdraw from all conflict which doesn’t immediately affect them. Or take guerrila warfarists, who hide in the mountains or forests — their strategy is withdrawl. A society will adapt itself as best it can.
(6) is probably right. Not only that, but withdrawl from something to which people are both accustomed and beholden to is (according to the “J-Curve Theory” in sociology) the recipe for revolution.
But, to tie together some of these threads: surely if Hobbes were right, then people could collectively be forward-thinking enough to conserve collectively in order to receive long-term benefits. For that’s all they’ve done with the soveriegn.