Antitrust and Ideology: Moral Goodness or Corruption
Published by Hanno Kaiser August 1st, 2006 in Philosophy, Law and SocietyAntitrust policy has often been portrayed as a struggle between free-marketers and populists. In The Ideological Origins and Evolution of Antitrust, William Page labels the two competing ideologies evolutionary and intentional.
The first of antitrust’s defining ideologies, which I call the evolutionary vision, views the market, framed by common law rules of property and contract, as a mechanism for facilitating free exchanges among countless individuals in the pursuit of their best interests. In that vision, the conditions that emerge from market processes, including the distribution of wealth, are fundamentally legitimate and, except in rare cases, unintended by any individual market actor. … The second great ideology, however, which I call the intentional vision, views the market as a mechanism within which powerful interests can coerce consumers, labor, and small businesses; market structures, consequently, tend toward monopoly. In the intentional vision, the unfair outcomes of market processes can and should be corrected by democratic, governmental intervention, including direct regulation.
This is an excellent summary, but let me try to put the issue a bit more starkly. The underlying question is: What is the moral significance of wealth or economic power? There are two competing views.
- Wealth as a sign of moral goodness. Wealth (and its implications, power, and unequal patterns of distribution) is the result of a series of free, consensual exchanges, of trades that, with a priori necessity, must have made both parties to the exchange better off (or else, people wouldn’t have traded). The implication is that, in a free market economy, one can only get rich by serving others. Power and wealth are the result of (and the just reward for) having bettered most everyone’s lot along the way. That, in a nutshell, is the core of market idealism.
- Wealth as a sign of moral corruption. Wealth (and its implications, power and unequal patterns of distribution) is the result of exploitation by means of coercion or deception. “Free, consensual exchanges” only exist among equals in power. In every other case, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must. The implication is, that one can get rich only by exploiting others. Wealth and power are the reward of the ruthless, of those who have been more successful in exploiting the weak. That, in a nutshell, is the core of coercion idealism.
These are the competing visions animating not only antitrust law and policy, but also much of the discussion about free markets, regulation, big business, socialism, distributive justice, and globalization. One critical insight is that the competing views don’t necessary rely on incompatible normative standards. Rather, their disagreement is couched in descriptive terms, in the proposed causal explanations for what brings about wealth and power: free exchange on the one hand, exploitation on the other. Of course, almost no participant in this discourse engages in the empirical work that would be required to provide the microfoundations for their beliefs. In that sense, both views are idealisms, reflective more of individual value commitments than of how the world really works. Casual empiricism at least suggests that almost every exchange contains elements of both, freedom and coercion (however loosely defined). The critical question is, of course: how much of each? An empirical answer to that question would bring us closer to solving the underlying age-old philosophical problem than entire libraries of conceptual analyses of “power” and “freedom” have brought us so far.
Note: Cross-posted at Antitrust Review.
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Everyone ought to be skeptical of so-called “a priori” truths, whether espoused by von Mises or Kant. “A priori” is just another way of saying “dogma”. Throw out the prior, and you make the entirety of the evolutionist’s story invalid, and make the exploitation assumption of the intentionalist’s story invalid as well.
The alternative is empiricism and epistemic positivism. But empiricism in social science can only seem to take us so far. It doesn’t tell us enough about how to interpret people in the micro-arena, and so far has largely failed to give us positive laws in the macro-arena.
It seems as though we have to settle for compromises: namely, fuzzy laws and model empiricism. And these philosophies of science provide the reams of theory that you mentioned, each theory providing support for one of the worldviews or the other. Notions of rational choice theory for the “evolutionists”, and things like the iron law of oligarchy for the “intentionists”, for instance.
As in all of science, the key to deciding which one is correct in a particular case is to draw out some of the observable implications of one model over the other. What can we expect about case so-and-so if the evolutionist story is correct? What can we expect if the intentionalist’s story is correct?
It’s not immediately obvious what the empirical implications for either are. And (for the sake of argument) if there weren’t any, then there’d be no getting around these dogmatic “ideal” worldviews to provide us with the toy models that we need to explain our way through evidence. What do you think, Hanno? Your experience must be able to shed some light on this.
Of course, both theories seem wrong to the naturalist, since both seem to ignore the role of opportunities in one’s free choices. The evolutionist (as she has been presented here) makes the idea of coercion impossible, because the opportunity to do otherwise is taken for granted. [Though I must admit that this is a very strange thing to say, seeing that while ostensible right-libertarians would be the ones making the argument in favor of trusts, they would at the same time would need the notion of coercion to make their anti-state moral arguments.] The intentionist on the other hand seems to take it for granted that the opportunities to do otherwise always float around zero.