There are scientific worries, first. (Is a six patient study a big enough sample to be externally valid? How would these patients really act when it came down to a moral decision? etc.) Part of the result may attributed to the interference from other cognitive factors: i.e., what if the patients’ abilities to *simulate* these what-if scenarios is what is being compromised, and not their abilities to sympathize in real scenarios?

There are worries having to do with how this article has framed the biopsychological issue. Frankly, some of the framing appears to be refuted by the study itself (as reported here anyway). The story reads: “the ventromedial prefrontal cortex… is thought to generate social emotions, like compassion”, and “This area when it’s working will give rise to social emotions that we can feel, like embarrassment, guilt, compassion that are critical to guiding our social behavior” (quote from Antonio Damasio). These are strong claims about the function of that area. But then the author writes: “all three groups also strongly rejected doing harm to others in situations that were not a matter of trading one certain death for another”, and “after repeatedly endorsing killing in these high-conflict situations… one patient told him, “Jeez, I’ve turned into a killer’”. These latter remarks are not, in any obvious way, the words of persons who lack compassion, which is what one would expect from the simple explanations given in the former quotes. Something has gone wrong.

There’s also the worry about where, exactly, utilitarianism comes from, philosophically. Is it the result of philosophical consideration (in this case, phrased in ‘what-if’ scenarios)? Is it a natural inclination with some psychological reality behind it? Or some mix of the two?

These all raise the more general worry about what *justifies* utilitarianism, and these philosophical worries underscore the empirical ones. One part of my thesis here has been that utilitarianism is not a fact of reasoning, but a thing that arises out of philosophical deliberation involving empathy (among other things). It seems that it is epistemically impossible to be a utilitarian without empathy, since the decision “how am I to optimize happiness?” involves the very act of predicting who will be happy and who will not. This aspect, perhaps the most interesting aspect, has been short-circuited by the researchers who evidently have just recited the hedonic facts of the situation to the patients.

Now this observation may seem like a non-sequitur in this context, until we understand that the methods that we use moral reasoning in social interaction are absolutely essential to whether or not an ethical doctrine is justified in practice for a given person.

That is to say, there is a difference between being justified as a meta-ethic, and justified in practice. Justification at the meta-ethical level, and justification at the practical level, are independent. A theory is justified as a meta-ethic if it limits out patently immoral options: for instance, if billions of lives are balanced against the life of one man, it is clearly immoral to favor the latter over the former. But it can only be justified as a fundamental ethical norm if it clearly and exclusively picks out the best options in practice.

This study has (imperfectly) tried to understand the normative decision-making at the practical level with respect to particular cases, not the meta-ethical level.* But I am not sure the findings say much even at the practical level. If utilitarianism is ever justified in practice, it is because it arises from the compassion and empathy of the subject taken to its most practical limits. Contrary to the expectations of the classical utilitarians, it is not just a conclusion that floats in the air; it must arise under the correct deliberative conditions. So even if these subjects were unable to be compassionate (which is a claim that has not been demonstrated!), they would be similarly unable to apply the principle of utility in a morally felicitous way.

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*And my interest all along has been to demonstrate utilitarianism as a meta-ethic, not a practical theory.

We can discuss “the best options in practice” in the abstract, or in context. In both cases, utility comes up wanting.

Utilitarianism obviously isn’t sufficient justification behind an abstract system of ethics. The utilitarian can offer plausible reasons behind why one should not engage in homicide for the purposes of involuntary organ donation, but that doesn’t change the fact that the “involuntary organ donation” case is, on the face of it, an immoral instance where utilitarianism has been applied.

Moreover, the plausible reasons that the utilitarian may come up with to try to connect theory and practice (i.e., by invoking rule-utilitarianism) may depend on the good sense and judgment of the person making the ethical decisions. Just as utilitarianism is not a fact of reason, justifiable as a meta-ethic across possible worlds, we may also expect that it is not a justifiable as a practical ethic that can help guide people of all characters. In some hands, utilitarianism may be used to justify great evil: for instance, if a person is delusional and misapplies the rule, or fails to have respect for the foundations of the rule.

But neither of these concessions affect its standing as a meta-ethic.