Comments on: Ben Nelson on Consequentialism http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/203 Notes from the intersection of law, society, technology, economics, and culture Tue, 06 Jan 2009 07:11:44 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2 By: Ben Nelson http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/203#comment-875 Ben Nelson Sat, 06 May 2006 23:49:37 +0000 http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/203#comment-875 But the strength of the rules which deontology has, and which extreme deontology thus inherits, cannot be ignored. For a sound maxim is simply more economical in practice than a utilitarian calculus, a disposition to virtue, or a casuistic storybook filled with case-studies. Principles are just easy to communicate. This is an essential virtue if one believes, as many do, that there is a "publicity condition" to morality: that all moral rules must be widely disseminated. Once we realise that maxims are economical, and that economy is of fundamental moral significance, one can't help seeing the advantages of deontology. Moreover, an extreme deontology can have strong motivational force. They can be phrased easily as commands, which can be pretty cut and dry. However an extreme deontology is fairly weak in terms of moral force. It provides guidance (do x), and reason for acting (to avoid punishment), but is unsatisfying about the origins of its moral content. In that sense, they may be, as you say, illusory. Kant gives ridiculous interpretations of the categorical imperative in a panoply of particular cases, but that doesn't mean that all of his formulations are unclear. IE: to always treat people, not just as means, but also as ends in themselves, is pretty clear. I'm afraid I can't make any sense of the phrase "a priori", despite just having finished a class on Kantian epistemology. It's a top contender in the history of philosophy for phrases which beg the question by their title alone. The only other runner up I can think of is Rand's "objectivism". So I'm not sure I know what you mean by clarity. I'm thinking in terms of whether or not a rule can be applied to ordinary cases with relative ease. Fundamental norms are generated out of certain meta-ethical positions. Mill and Bentham did not seem to take this notion seriously -- they felt that the principle of utility was an obvious fact of reason -- but I think they were being modest. We can rationally reconstruct the presuppositions of utilitarianism that are related to issues of human nature, the world, and moral meaning, and presume that the conclusion implicitly through them. The first doctrine of meta-ethics would have to be the definition of ethics itself. I take it to be something to the effect of, "guidance to the good and right a) life, b) action, and c) thoughts concerned with life and action". Other issues would have to be addressed -- 'What is the right?' and 'What is of intrinsic value (What is the good)?'. Two more conditions are explicitly held by utilitarians: ethical consequentialism and welfarism-hedonism. I would add a third doctrine: that of moral interactionism, the doctrine that all moral systems must be either other-regarding or arise out of social interaction to be considered moral (which invariably leads to the publicity condition). Other issues which have been mentioned which play a role here. One issue may be to answer the satisficing-optimizing question mentioned earlier (or to scrap the distinction and offer an alternative). Another may be a discussion of the 'governing rules' of practical ethics, already mentioned. Another may have to do with development of the correct character and virtues. Probably there are others. Some typical meta-ethical questions that deserve answers, but which I take to be of peripheral interest to this discussion, are: cognitivism-noncognitivism, naturalism v. non-naturalism, the structure of an action, the nature of life, the structure of a social system, etc. But the strength of the rules which deontology has, and which extreme deontology thus inherits, cannot be ignored. For a sound maxim is simply more economical in practice than a utilitarian calculus, a disposition to virtue, or a casuistic storybook filled with case-studies. Principles are just easy to communicate. This is an essential virtue if one believes, as many do, that there is a “publicity condition” to morality: that all moral rules must be widely disseminated. Once we realise that maxims are economical, and that economy is of fundamental moral significance, one can’t help seeing the advantages of deontology. Moreover, an extreme deontology can have strong motivational force. They can be phrased easily as commands, which can be pretty cut and dry.

However an extreme deontology is fairly weak in terms of moral force. It provides guidance (do x), and reason for acting (to avoid punishment), but is unsatisfying about the origins of its moral content. In that sense, they may be, as you say, illusory.

Kant gives ridiculous interpretations of the categorical imperative in a panoply of particular cases, but that doesn’t mean that all of his formulations are unclear. IE: to always treat people, not just as means, but also as ends in themselves, is pretty clear.

I’m afraid I can’t make any sense of the phrase “a priori”, despite just having finished a class on Kantian epistemology. It’s a top contender in the history of philosophy for phrases which beg the question by their title alone. The only other runner up I can think of is Rand’s “objectivism”. So I’m not sure I know what you mean by clarity. I’m thinking in terms of whether or not a rule can be applied to ordinary cases with relative ease.

Fundamental norms are generated out of certain meta-ethical positions. Mill and Bentham did not seem to take this notion seriously — they felt that the principle of utility was an obvious fact of reason — but I think they were being modest. We can rationally reconstruct the presuppositions of utilitarianism that are related to issues of human nature, the world, and moral meaning, and presume that the conclusion implicitly through them.

The first doctrine of meta-ethics would have to be the definition of ethics itself. I take it to be something to the effect of, “guidance to the good and right a) life, b) action, and c) thoughts concerned with life and action”. Other issues would have to be addressed — ‘What is the right?’ and ‘What is of intrinsic value (What is the good)?’. Two more conditions are explicitly held by utilitarians: ethical consequentialism and welfarism-hedonism. I would add a third doctrine: that of moral interactionism, the doctrine that all moral systems must be either other-regarding or arise out of social interaction to be considered moral (which invariably leads to the publicity condition).

Other issues which have been mentioned which play a role here. One issue may be to answer the satisficing-optimizing question mentioned earlier (or to scrap the distinction and offer an alternative). Another may be a discussion of the ‘governing rules’ of practical ethics, already mentioned. Another may have to do with development of the correct character and virtues. Probably there are others.

Some typical meta-ethical questions that deserve answers, but which I take to be of peripheral interest to this discussion, are: cognitivism-noncognitivism, naturalism v. non-naturalism, the structure of an action, the nature of life, the structure of a social system, etc.

]]>