First: a taxonomy. We can separate between two kinds of consequentialism: ethical and psychological. I take it for granted that psychological consequentialism is correct: that is to say, the thesis that the moral value of a thing arises out of our conscious and subconscious expectation of certain consequences which arise out of it. Ethical consequentialism, which is the more common meaning of “consequentialism”, may be understood as the doctrine which tells us that the right thing to do in a particular situation is dictated by a consideration of good consequences. It, in turn, comes in optimizing and satisficing varieties (though its associations with utilitarianism have created a habit of the doctrine being tied to optimizing consequences, as with the work of Brink etc.); where the optimizer is constantly striving to maximize some good, while the satisficer is happy after a certain minimal threshold is met.

The analysis of morality involves at least two categories: fundamental norms (categorical imperative, principle of utility, etc), and mid-level principles (prime facie duties). Fundamental norms straddle a borderline between the general field of abstract ethics (which provide intelligible ultimate rules to follow) and that of meta-ethics (which try to explain the intuitions, semantics, nature of world, etc behind the f. norms).

Next: an argument. Both varieties of consequentialism are by-and-large just explanatory meta-ethical doctrines which describe the genesis of moral systems in all of the most plausible of their forms. So it isn’t fair to ask the doctrine to have much normative power. While it may have some moral force to it, it is a limited force. Most of the labor that it does is in the field of meta-ethics.

To see what I mean, take one of the usual trolley-tracks examples, where the operator of a runaway train must decide whether to kill one pedestrian to save five others or not. Consequentialism provides zero guidance on what to do; it only provides a meek framework for analysis. A satisficing consequentialist, Stan, may believe he must never kill, because being in any way involved in the ending of a life is a moral stain; and Stan values the good will, and respect for persons. In which case, the most satisfactory condition for Stan would be if he did not kill a single person. Either way he chooses, he cannot fulfill his duties; no moral guidance can be provided. In a completely different vein, a morally pathological optimizing consequentialist, Opelia, might consider only the wellbeing of flowers to be of moral importance, and so constantly strive to make the world safer for flowers; and in the process, kill all humans for fertilizer. These are just two examples which show how consequentialism alone is not, and cannot be, clear.

It is true that utilitarianism and some kinds of ethical consequentialism may deliver a kind of moral clarity on the goals of the situation. However, ethical consequentialism proper says nothing about the matter: it is, for the mostpart, normatively opaque. So it is not true that “for a consequentialist the moral answer is clear: the interests of the many trump those of the few”. They may, or may not. Whereas at least one deontological reply would be identical to the satisficing consequentialist’s reply: in this decidedly unfortunate situation, one’s choices are constrained, one’s will is roped up, and thus one cannot fulfill their duties / satisfy consequences. I suspect this analysis is powerful enough to account for more than that.

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I don’t worry about utilitarianism being unable to accomodate hard-core deontology, because I think the latter are morally deficient. If, for utilitarianism, rule-consequentialism collapses into a special kind of act-consequentialism, then I have only shrugs to offer. I don’t see the problem in that. Quite the opposite: I would argue that the absolutism which characterizes the hard-core deontological thinking is morally deficient. So that argument would probably steer a bit closer to what we’re looking for in a moral system. However, my purpose for the last two posts was just to defend consequentialism. I can pass onto the next subject, but I’m not sure I’ve been convincing enough. And if you disagree with my points here, the rest would probably be disagreeable as well. (So it goes.)

We may learn many things from the law, to be sure. It is inherantly practical; abstract ethics is errantly practical. In some sense, juggling mid-level principles, prime-facie duties, values, etc. is the real caramel core of ethics. But any attempt to abandon fundamental norms is, I think, premature, misguided, and will (given enough time) negotiate away virtue and morality.

There are at least three governing principles which are key to practical ethics (as in law): comprimise between two virtues, seek the mean between two opposed vices, and comprimise the needs of principles and those of reality. The first two actively rely upon the third, lest they become mere empty pragmatism (whose advice sways with the winds of politics). The third is fed by fundamental norms.