<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!-- generator="wordpress/2.2" -->
<rss version="2.0" 
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/">
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: What&#8217;s wrong with Jurisprudence?</title>
	<link>http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/119</link>
	<description>Notes from the intersection of law, society, technology, economics, and culture</description>
	<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2009 12:30:41 +0000</pubDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2</generator>

	<item>
		<title>By: Matt</title>
		<link>http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/119#comment-286</link>
		<author>Matt</author>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2005 00:03:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.lawsocietyblog.com/archives/119#comment-286</guid>
		<description>This also seems wrong to me, at least in the case of several seemingly paradigm cases of contemporary jurisprudence.  Leiter, for example, makes heavy use of positive political science and psychology in arguing for his "naturalized" jurisprudence.  Brian Bix, Timmothy Endicotte, and others make use of large parts of the philosophy of language that can't be called moral philosophy by any means.  Claire Finkelstein has made use of work by Bratman and general rational choice theory, and so on.  So, at least this seems to over-state things pretty seriously.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This also seems wrong to me, at least in the case of several seemingly paradigm cases of contemporary jurisprudence.  Leiter, for example, makes heavy use of positive political science and psychology in arguing for his &#8220;naturalized&#8221; jurisprudence.  Brian Bix, Timmothy Endicotte, and others make use of large parts of the philosophy of language that can&#8217;t be called moral philosophy by any means.  Claire Finkelstein has made use of work by Bratman and general rational choice theory, and so on.  So, at least this seems to over-state things pretty seriously.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
